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Egan: United States, France, and West Florida, 1803-1807

THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND
WEST FLORIDA, 1803-1807
by CLIFFORD L. EGAN
APRIL 30, 1803, in one of the great real estate transactions
of history, France sold the United States the Louisiana
Territory, an immense land with inexact boundaries. Seldom in
history has one nation purchased so much for so little. With the
signatures of Robert R. Livingston, James Monroe, and Francois
de Marbois, America’s land area was almost doubled. At the
same moment all differences between France and the United
States seemingly were obliterated. Although President Jefferson
had previously spoken of a British alliance since he feared
Napoleon as a neighbor, he and his fellow Americans now looked
to the future confident that their land was destined to span the
continent. Meanwhile, the government sought a favorable adjustment of Louisiana’s boundary, especially the acquisition of
the strip of Spanish land between the Mississippi and Perdido
rivers known as West Florida.
Coming so close on the heels of the Louisiana sale, French
support of America’s Florida claim could only have made relations between the countries even more amicable and further
enhanced American opinion of France. Continued British arrogance on the high seas and off America’s coast would have deepened this reservoir. Instead, Napoleon surrendered to the allures
of a subsidy from Spain and perhaps the prospect of personal
gain from a nation whose financial position was even shakier
than his own. In the end Spain lost West Florida, but Napoleon
was the real loser. Not only did he sacrifice his subsidy, but
ultimately his failure to accurately gauge Spanish sentiment
resulted in an uprising that in the course of six years drained
French resources and contributed to the collapse of the First
Empire.
Napoleon failed to proclaim his decision until well into the
summer of 1804. Then Talleyrand disclosed his country’s attitude
in a series of diplomatic despatches. In essence, his announcement
stated that the United States could claim only that territory
N
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which France had received from Spain, and he claimed that the
Louisiana-West Florida boundary followed the Mississippi and
Iberville rivers and then Lake Maurepas and Lake Pontchartrain. 1 Relegated to limbo was the crafty foreign minister’s
earlier utterance about the United States “making the most” of
the uncharted boundary of the wilderness.
Ignorant of France’s decision, Jefferson disregarded Livingston’s constant suggestions that the United States seize West
Florida and present France and Spain with a fait accompli. 2
Instead, impressed with French assurances, the President and
his ever logical secretary of state saw the territorial transfer as
“nothing more than a sequel and completion of the policy which
led France into her own treaty of Cession.” 3 To this end they
directed that Monroe, then minister to the Court of St. James,
proceed to Madrid to aid Minister Charles Pinckney as soon as
the press of Anglo-American diplomatic activity permitted.
Monroe enthusiastically concurred with his orders to travel via
Paris to “ascertain the views of the French Government.” 4 But
as he was receiving his orders, Napoleon was deciding against
aiding the United States.
In retrospect it would be easy to fault Jefferson and Madison for not accepting Livingston’s advice. On the other hand,
how were they to know that Napoleon would choose to fol1. Talleyrand to Pierre de Ruel Beurnonville, July 5, 1804, Archives du
Ministere des Affairs Etrangeres, Correspondance Politique, EtatsUnis (photostats, Library of Congress), LVII; Talleyrand to Louis
Turreau, July 23, August 8, 1804, ibid.; Talleyrand to Gavina, August 30, 1804, in James A. Robertson, ed. and trans., Louisiana Under
the Rule of Spain, France, and the United States, 1785-1807, 2 vols.
(Cleveland, 1911), II, 196, 198. (Admiral Federico Gravina, Spanish
representative to France, is incorrectly spelled in Robertson.)
2. Robert R. Livingston to James Madison, June 20, 1804, James
Madison Papers, Library of Congress; Livingston to James Monroe,
September 15, 1804, James Monroe Papers, Library of Congress;
Livingston to Edward Livingston, September 18, 1804, Livingston
Papers, New-York Historical Society.
3. Madison to Livingston, March 31, 1804, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The
Writings of James Madison, 9 vols. (New York and London, 19001910), VII, 127.
4. Madison to Monroe, April 15, 1804, ibid., 141. See also Monroe to
Thomas Jefferson, March 15, 1804, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library
of Congress.
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low so illogical a path? Franco-American relations were then
more harmonious than they had been or were to be for several
years; Madison and his chief reasoned that the French would
continue such a course since it was to her interest to do so. 5
Seizure of West Florida would have clouded this amity and
violated a primary Republican tenet: to avoid alienation of any
nation. Thus Monroe’s instructions were as valid as the tediously
slow and often unreliable channels of communication of that
day allowed.
Urged on by the secretary of state, Monroe left London in
October 1804, and arrived in Paris a few days later. Livingston
immediately informed him of intelligence that cast a pall over his
mission. On the twentieth day of September, Marbois, betraying
concern for his responsibility, the public treasury, had intimated
that the United States might purchase East Florida as well as
West Florida “giving 60 millions [of francs] for them . . . .”
It was evident, Livingston cautioned, that “France wishes to make
our controversy favorable to her finances.” 6 Apparently undeterred by his fellow diplomat’s revelation and his opposition to
any correspondence, Monroe dispatched a lengthy letter to
Talleyrand. He reminded the foreign minister that France had
committed herself to aid America to obtain “Florida” when the
Louisiana treaty was signed. After reviewing the immediate
details surrounding Spanish-American differences, Monroe
stressed the righteousness of America’s claims and asked directly
for France’s “good offices” to aid his Madrid mission. 7 Expecting
a prompt and favorable reply, Monroe decided to wait before
proceeding to Spain. His calculation for a speedy answer proved
unmerited. Days grew into a week, a week into a fortnight, and
still Monroe received no official communication from Talleyrand.
Unofficially he had learned much. From Livingston he discovered that Pierre de Ruel Beurnonville, French ambassador to
the court of Charles IV, had instructions to aid upcoming talks.
5. For this viewpoint see Madison to John Armstrong, November 10,
1804, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State: All
Countries (Department of State Archives, National Archives).
6. Livingston to Madison, September 21, 1804, Livingston Papers, NewYork Historical Society.
7. Monroe to Talleyrand, November 8, 1804, Archives du Ministere
des affaires Etrangeres, LVII.
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Livingston disclosed on another occasion that he had heard
Napoleon himself express his desire to promote Jefferson’s aims. 8
These hopeful indications, however, were offset by other information. With Livingston accompanying him, Monroe met Talleyrand and told him, as if the ex-Bishop of Autun did not already
know, that he was en route to Madrid. “Aye, I understand you,”
Talleyrand replied, and then added darkly, “You will have much
difficulty to succeed there.” When Monroe alluded to the advantages of French offices in smoothing Spanish intransigence,
9
the foreign minister managed a “smile.” Shortly after this
tete-a-tete, Monroe conversed with Marbois and Alexandre
Maurice Blanc de La Noutte, Comte d’Hauterive, Talleyrand’s
chief assistant. Frankly stating his objectives in Spain, he elicited
Marbois’ equally candid opinion that “suitable pecuniary accomodations” might promote a settlement. D’Hauterive spoke of
both parties making sacrifices: “Spain must cede territory, and
. . . the U. States must pay money.” Perhaps with memories of
earlier diplomatic incidents of a similar tenor, Monroe emphasized that the United States would pay no money under such
circumstances. 10
Fearful that he was missing opportunities at Madrid and
weary of waiting in Paris despite such gala occasions as Napoleon’s crowning on December 2, 1804, Monroe elected to journey
to Madrid via Bordeaux and Bayonne. 11 His decision to do so
has been severely criticized in view of Livingston’s admonitions
and obvious French uncooperativeness. 12 Yet Monroe’s instruc8. Livingston to Monroe, November 12, Livingston to Madison, November 21, 1804, Livingston Papers, New-York Historical Society.
9. Monroe to Madison; December 16, 1804, in Stanislaus M. Hamilton,
ed., The Writings of James Monroe, 7 vols. (New York and London,
1898-1903), IV, 280.
10. Monroe to Madison, December 16, 1804, ibid., 281-82.
11. Armstrong to Madison, December 24, 1804, Despatches from United
States Ministers to France (Department of State Archives, National
Archives), thus explained Monroe’s departure. In recollections written
many years later Monroe stated he knew his instructions were outdated, yet he offered no reason for continuing his journey. See
Stuart Gerry Brown, ed., The Autobiography of James Monroe
(Syracuse, 1959), 205.
12. Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1800-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 259.
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tions left to his descretion the course to follow. 13 Aware of his
superiors’ desire for peace, Monroe possibly felt all avenues to
avoid hostilities should be explored. Personal investigation of the
Spanish scene would enable the administration to quash dissidents who might accuse the President of not pursuing peace.
Nor had Monroe received an official answer-positive or negative-from Talleyrand when he left Paris on December 8. In
light of these factors his avowal to “pursue the object intrusted
to me with zeal and diligence, and I trust with success” seems
plausible. 14
Two weeks after Monroe left Paris Talleyrand answered his
letter of November 8. Unfortunately for American purposes,
France denied West Florida’s inclusion in the transfer of territory. 15 This stance not only represented loyalty to their new
ally, Spain having gone to war against Britain on December 14,
but it was a victory as well for Talleyrand; solely by such a
course, he argued to Napoleon, would America’s arrogance
toward Spain be curbed. Let them give up some of their unjust
pretenses he urged, and only then would they merit a favorable
word. 16 Left unmentioned in these communications was any
reference to “pecuniary accomodations.” Nonetheless, Madison
was fully appraised that France “had determined to convert the
negotiation into a job.” 17 On his way to Madrid, Monroe remained unaware of these happenings.
Biding his time in Madrid until Monroe arrived was Charles
Pinckney, a member of the distinguished South Carolina family.
Though most Pinckneys faithfully supported the Federalists,
Charles aligned himself with the Jeffersonian Republicans. Consequently, after Jefferson’s inauguration in March 1801, his
loyalty was rewarded with the appointment to the Spanish post.
By late 1803 he was seeking agreement on three issues: first,
13. Madison to Monroe, October 26, 1804, Monroe Papers, Library of
Congress.
14. Monroe to Fulwar Skipwith, December 18, 1804, Monroe Papers,
New York Public Library.
15. Talleyrand to Monroe, December 21, 1804, Monroe Papers, Library
of Congress.
16. “Rapport a l’empereur,” November 19, 1804, Archives du Ministere
des Affaires Etrangeres, LVII.
17. Armstrong to Madison, December 24, 1804, Despatches from France.
See also Armstrong to Madison, December 20, 1804, ibid.
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compensation for depredations caused by French vessels operating out of Spanish waters during the undeclared war from
1797-1800; second, Spanish acceptance of the Louisiana Purchase; and, third, the cession of West Florida. Recognizing the
difficulties he faced in accomplishing any of the three aims,
Monroe, with administrative sanction, had planned to travel to
Spain immediately after Louisiana had been purchased. Resumption of the Anglo-French war had precluded this. Forced
to carry on alone, Pinckney mistakenly had linked the three objectives and thus blocked individual accords. 18
Monroe’s arrival in Madrid changed nothing. The Spanish
officials expertly sidetracked the Americans and the stalemate
continued. Pinckney, familiar with the country’s internal affairs,
attributed Spanish stubbornness to France. The Emperor and
Talleyrand evidently believed that they could “talk in high and
arrogant terms of our country’s aggressions . . . and we would
shrink into nothing and give up claims and meekly receive
reprimand for having dared to make them.” 19 Conscious of the
prevailing French attitude, Spain used it to her own benefit.
On the other hand, Monroe, except for one dark moment of
despair, refused to credit Napoleon with any devious plan. He
was unable to comprehend why France would act against her
personal interests. After all, he reasoned, France relied on American shipping to carry cargoes from her blockaded colonies to
home ports. Was she not aware that American compliances with
her desire to interdict trade with the Negroes of San Domingo
might hinge on a Spanish settlement? Similarly, he calculated,
the French certainly feared an Anglo-American rapprochement. 20 From these cogent reasons Monroe inferred that Talleyrand was withholding intelligence from Napoleon about the true
state of affairs between Spain and America. Hence he appealed
to John Armstrong, American minister to France, to approach
18. See J. Harold Easterby’s account in Dumas Malone, et al., eds.,
Dictionary of American Biography, 22 vols. (New York, 1925-1958),
XIV, 611-14; Madison to Charles Pinckney, October 12, 1803, in
Hunt, Writings of James Madison, VII, 71-72.
19. Pinckney to Madison, March 7, 1805, in Isaac Joslin Cox, The West
Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A Study in American Diplomacy
(Baltimore, 1918), 127.
20. Monroe to Armstrong, March 1, 1805, in Henry Adams, History of
the United States, 9 vols. (New York, 1889-1891), III, 30-31.
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the Emperor through someone other than Talleyrand, preferably
Joseph Bonaparte. 21
While Monroe and Pinckney were bargaining, Armstrong
labored to win French support and offered reasoning paralleling
that of Monroe’s. Unhappily he found that regardless of his
approach, the French were obdurate. When he alluded to the
possibility of an Anglo-American accord allowing the Americanization of the Floridas, for example, he was informed that “we
can neither doubt nor hesitate, - we must take part with
Spain.” 22 Other inquiries received similar rejoinders. Endeavoring to perceive the motivation behind France’s policy, Armstrong
gathered two possible explanations. Greed for money at Spain’s
expense was one possibility. He learned also that France had
been seeking to purchase the disputed land since 1803. In French
hands potentiality for financial gain would be definitely enhanced.
These explanations alone did not suffice to illuminate France’s
course. Whereas Monroe viewed America in possession of compelling arguments, Armstrong discerned that the French were
not at all convinced of this. Unperturbed about the prospects of
a British-American alliance, they hinted at the seizure of exposed
American property in Holland as well as in France should the
United States break off negotiations. 23 Unknown to Armstrong,
there was another reason why the French acted with disdain.
On January 4, 1805, France and Spain had concluded an agreement whereby France undertook to guarantee Spain’s “territorial
integrity” in Europe “and the return of colonies seized from
Spain in the course of the current war.” 24 Even the opportunistic
Talleyrand would have found it difficult to evade explicit guarantees so soon after the treaty was signed.
Almost as baffling as French policy toward the United States
was Monroe’s refusal to recognize Napoleon’s knowledge of
Spanish-American negotiations. In one letter from Paris, Arm21. Monroe to Armstrong, March 17, 31, 1805, in Cox, West Florida
Controversy, 127, 129-30.
22. Armstrong to Monroe, March 12, 1805, Monroe Papers, New York
Public Library. See also Armstrong to Monroe, April 15, 1805, ibid.
23. Armstrong to Monroe, March 12, April 1, 1805, ibid.; and H. Preble
to Monroe, March 14, 1805, ibid.
24. Francis Gardiner Davenport and Charles O. Paullin, eds., European
Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies, 4 vols. (Washington, 1917-1937), IV, 189.
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strong said Joseph Bonaparte himself had intervened on behalf
of the United States with no consequences. Another note openly
stated that “de l’argent-beaucoup d’argent is what they want, &
what they insist on, and it is (they say) the only means of terminating our differences. . . .” 25 Armstrong could not have been
more blunt when he informed Monroe that at French whim
Spain and the United States “will in fact be a couple of oranges
in her hands which she will squeeze at pleasure, and against
each other, and that which yields the most will be the best served
or rather the best injured.” 26 In spite of the evidence accumulated, Monroe continued to deny that his erstwhile benefactor
Napoleon could be at fault. From accusing Talleyrand for his
frustrations, he shifted his denunciations to Livingston, who had
since returned to the United States. The latter was guilty,
Monroe charged, because one of his undetailed “projects” had
persuaded Talleyrand to abstain from intervening against Spain
2 7
Why Monroe recoiled from reality is
during the mediation.
unclear. Conceivably he could not bear the thought of failure
in Spain on the heels of no accomplishment in London and Paris.
In any event he left Madrid in July 1805, for London via Paris.
Three months later Pinckney left Spain, his mission unfulfilled.
In Washington the President and Secretary of State Madison
observed the proceedings with equanimity. Jefferson felt that the
failure of Monroe’s mission meant simply that the United States
would have to await peace to arrange a settlement. Expressing
surprise that France would openly align herself with Spain,
Madison nevertheless was confident of a settlement when the
French awakened to the fact that they could not get their “hand
into our pocket,” and realized the serious danger of Anglo2 8
Available evidence indicates that adAmerican harmony.
ministration leaders and others trusted that the fates of war
would work to America’s advantage. At the same time they
25. Armstrong to Monroe, March 18, 1805, Monroe Papers, New York
Public Library.
26. Armstrong to Monroe, May 4, 1805, ibid.
27. Monroe to Armstrong, July 2, Monroe to Madison, July 6, 1805, in
Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, IV, 301, 302.
28. Madison to Livingston, July 5, 1805, in Letters and Other Writings
of James Madison, 4 vols. (New York, 1884), II, 213. See also
Madison to Armstrong, June 6, 1805, Instructions of the Department of State.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol47/iss3/3

8

Egan: United States, France, and West Florida, 1803-1807
U NITED S TATES , F RANCE ,

AND

W EST F LORIDA

235

continued to believe, as Monroe doggedly did, that Napoleon
would act as French interests dictated; that is, favorably to the
United States.
This maddening American self-assurance was conveyed by
Minister Louis Turreau to his master. Proud that French intercession had “stopped everything” concerning the Floridas, Turreau revealed that Jefferson was untroubled by this action.
Since Napoleon wished it, the President said, negotiations would
be “adjourned to a more favorable time,” not negating the fact
that the United States might eventually have her way. Pressing
Madison to explain why America sought to expand southward
instead of northward into the Canadas at British expense, the
secretary merely affirmed, “When the pear is ripe it will fall of
its own accord.” Astounded as he was at American poise, Turreau
marveled at the ambitious, aggrandizing policies pursued by
Republican leaders who were supported by a feeble military
structure. “To conquer without war” was America’s principal
aim, he asserted, and only France could thwart the Yankees. To
this end he envisioned Spain’s ceding Cuba and the Floridas to
France; the Floridas would become a major base for French
troops capable of striking into the vitals of the brash republic or
into the Caribbean. Then the Americans would halt their
bombastic oratory. 2 9 As interesting as this very lengthy communication was, it was unrealistic and erroneous on several
points. Neither the President nor his confidant, Madison, intimated that they would meekly surrender chances for obtaining
Florida. As Turreau divined, America sought additional territories
which she deemed to be essential for her national security. His
proposal to dispatch French troops to the Floridas should Spain
cede the land actually contradicted itself. For in the same despatch that he broached this idea, Turreau admitted that defensively the Americans could be quite effective, though he scorned
the numerous militia. Perhaps Turreau’s report was most in
error because it connoted the idea that Jefferson and his colleagues were content with the status quo. No estimate could
have been more removed from reality.
By mid-summer of the prosperous year 1805 the administration had already moved on one front when Jefferson nominated
29. Turreau to Talleyrand, July 9, 1805, Archives du Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres, LVIII.
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James Bowdoin, a wealthy Massachusetts Republican with impeccable family credentials, as Pinckney’s replacement. Desirous
of Monroe’s London post, Bowdoin settled for the lesser Madrid
assignment despite extremely bad health. 30 To serve as his
secretary of legation, his cousin, George W. Erving, was transferred from London where he was an agent for American seamen. The son of a “moderate loyalist,” Erving was British
educated. Returning to America in 1790, he developed a strong
affinity for Jeffersonian democracy and was rewarded with office
as a result of the “Revolution of 1800.” 31 Incapacitated by his
weak condition, Bowdoin was excused from the usual Washington meetings and left for Europe directly from Boston. In lieu
of verbal instructions, the President forwarded a private letter
which Bowdoin had ample time to peruse on his slow ocean
journey. Describing relations with Spain as “vitally interesting,”
Jefferson emphasized America’s desire for friendly intercourse.
Spain, however, had “met our advances with jealousy, secret
malice, and ill faith.” Hence American patience was wearing
thin. Bowdoin’s mission was of crucial import because “the issue
. . . depending between us will decide whether our relations
with her are to be sincerely friendly, or permanently hostile.” 32
Arriving at the Spanish port of Santander in July, the new
minister learned of the inglorious fate of Monroe’s efforts. Still
plagued by ill health, he decided to beat a hasty retreat to
London’s more congenial atmosphere, reasoning that nothing
could be resolved in Madrid. After conversing with Monroe, he
journeyed to Paris where he hoped that the French, impressed
by his presence, would promote a Spanish-American treaty.
Apparently he overlooked or downgraded the possibility of John
Armstrong, the accredited American representative in Paris,
being jealous.
Of much more consequence than Bowdoin’s appointment and
contradicting what he had told Turreau in July about waiting
30. Henry Dearborn to James Bowdoin, November 13, 1804, in the
Bowdoin and Temple Papers, Part II. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, 1907), 7th Series, VI, 235.
31. See Charles E. Hill’s sketch in the Dictionary of American Biography,
VI, 181-82.
32. Jefferson to Bowdoin, April 27, 1805, Thomas Jefferson Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society.
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for a more “favorable time,” Jefferson resolved that West Florida
must be secured even if force had to be applied. Appreciative that
fulfillment of this goal might result in a collision with France,
the President asked for the views of his cabinet concerning
Spanish affairs and an alliance with Britain. 33 Such a pact would
strike at the Spaniards’ “confident reliance” on the “omnipotence
of Buonaparte”; America would have an ally even if a European
peace was concluded. 3 4 Doubtless Englishmen would welcome
such an opportunity. “The first wish of every Englishman’s
heart is to see us once more fighting by their sides against
France,” he assured Madison. 3 5 This was not the first occasion
the supposed Anglophobe Jefferson pondered an alliance with
Britain. Before the Louisiana acquisition, when it appeared
France was to be America’s new neighbor, he had brooded over
the feasibility of an Anglo-American arrangement. The timely
sale of the territory ended this flirtatious idea.
Now cabinet coolness killed the scheme again. Foremost in
doubting the efficacy of any accord was Madison. Over a month
and a half period he pointed out that any favors extended by
Britain would have to be reciprocated. Another time he said he
was not opposed to an understanding with Britain as long as it
left America free to make adjustments with Spain. He left unanswered what nation would make a treaty on this basis. Cautioning his chief against a treaty on another occasion, the secretary of state enjoined him to realize the advantages presented
by the spread of war across Europe in the autumn of 1805.
Preoccupied on the Continent, France would remain aloof from
Spanish-American talks, thus obviating the need for an alliance. 36
33. Jefferson to Robert Smith, August 7, 1805, Jefferson Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society; Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, August 7, 1805, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress.
34. Jefferson to Madison, August 8, 1805, Jefferson Papers, Massachusetts
Historical Society; Jefferson to Madison, August 17, 1805, Madison
Papers, Library of Congress.
35. Jefferson to Madison, August 25, 27, 1805, in H. A. Washington, ed.,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 9 vols. (New York, 1853-1857),
IV, 584-86.
36. Madison to Jefferson, August 20, September 30, October 16, 1805,
Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress. See also Madison to George
W. Erving, November 1, 1805, in Hunt, Writings of James Madison,
VII, 187-88, not in text.
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Tactfully Madison never directly vetoed the idea of an alliance,
but the overall gist of his communications left no doubt about
his position. Echoing Madison’s views was Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury. In a prolix paper entitled “Spanish Affairs,”
the secretary branded claims extending westward toward the
Rio Grande River too tenuous to merit war. Although claims to
West Florida were much stronger, Gallatin still opposed a resort
to arms. War, he said, would diminish import duties, lead to the
seizure of American shipping in France and Spain, and harm
America’s peaceful image overseas while linking the new nation’s
fate to that of Europe. “If Bonaparte, haughty and obstinate as
he is, shall think proper to persevere, notwithstanding our taking
Florida, then our fate becomes linked to that of England,”
Gallatin noted sadly, “and the conditions of our peace will depend on the general result of the European war.” 37 Only
Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith spoke favorably of an
alliance, but then solely if France, “as there is reason to think,”
backed Spain. Danger to exposed seaboard cities and New
Orleans would dictate “an alliance with a nation capable of
affording us the requisite naval assistance.” 38 The esteem with
which the President held the opinions of Madison and Gallatin
doomed his alliance mirage.
Unknown to the President and his colleagues, Minister Armstrong had been approached by an unnamed French agent.
Extending propositions which he warranted would break the
existing deadlock, the stranger averred that “The more you refer
to the decision of the Emperor, the more sure & easy will be
the settlement.” Spain would part with the Floridas provided
the United States accepted five provisions, the key one of which
specified “ten millions of dollars to be given by the U.S. to
Spain.” 39 With his knowledge of similar suggestions made to
37. Gallatin to Jefferson, September 12, 1805, Gallatin Papers, NewYork Historical Society.
38. Smith to Jefferson, September 16, 1805, Robert and William Smith
Papers, Maryland Historical Society.
39. Armstrong to Madison, September 14, 1805, Despatches from France.
See also Armstrong to Madison, March 9, 1806, ibid. Almost four
years after this event, former Ohio Senator John Smith informed
Senator Timothy Pickering that Navy Secretary Smith had shown
him a letter from Armstrong describing the visits of an unidentified
Frenchman. The latter spoke of the United States’ purchasing the
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Livingston and previous experiences himself, Armstrong could
not have been aghast at the proposal which he duly transmitted
to Washington.
Exactly when Jefferson received news of the offer to Armstrong is not clear. 40 But groping for an alternative to no policy
whatsoever, he made the most fateful decision of his eight years
in office. Sometime in October 1805, he anticipated the proposition to buy West Florida through France. An omen of this was a
letter to Gallatin where he asked, “Is Paris not the place? France
the agent?” With peace at least a year away, another effort to
accommodate the Spaniards might prove fruitful. 41 More explicitly, he informed Madison that the European scene offered
America ample time to bargain at Madrid and “at Paris,
through Armstrong, or Armstrong & Monroe as negociators,
France as the mediator, the price of the Floridas as the means.
We need not care,” he added, “who gets that: and an enlargement of the sum we had thought of may be the bait for France.”
In the interim it should be impressed upon Spain that any
thrust to alter the status quo would be met with American
countermeasures. 42
Floridas “ a n d t h a t F r a n c e w o u l d n e g o t i a t e t h e p u r c h a s e , i f t h e
U. States would take the bargain off their hands.” On another
occasion the Frenchman mentioned a $7,000,000 purchase price.
While the transaction was being negotiated the United States, he said,
should vigorously denounce Spanish attacks on American vessels.
Napoleon could then cite these remarks to help him persuade the
Spaniards that they should sell the Floridas “and get the proceeds
of an honourable sale, than to loose [sic] them by American cupidity
& conquest.” Smith to Timothy Pickering, July 17, 1809, Timothy
Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Adams, History of
the United States, III, 373, identifies the stranger as an agent of the
French speculator Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard and Marbois. Furthermore, he asserts Napoleon was cognizant of the “errand.”
40. Entry of November 19, 1805, in Franklin B. Sawvel, ed., The Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1903), 233-34.
41. Jefferson to Gallatin, October 23, 1805, in Henry Adams, ed., The
Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1879), I, 257-58.
42. Jefferson to Madison, October 23, 1805, Madison Papers, Library
of Congress. Also Jefferson to Robert Smith, October 24, Jefferson
to Wilson Cary Nicholas, October 25, and Jefferson to Samuel Smith,
November 1, 1805, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress.
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At a cabinet meeting in early November, the President presented his ideas in concrete form. France was to be informed that
the United States was making her “last effort” to reach an
“amicable settlement” with Spain. Through the French the
Spaniards were to be tendered an unspecified amount of money
for their rights to the Floridas. After enumerating other provisions more concerned with Spain than France, Jefferson justified his first proposal as a stimulus to France since the Spaniards
were “in arrears” in subsidy payments to Napoleon. 43 Within a
week Jefferson noted cryptically that Armstrong had enclosed
French proposals which were almost “equivalent to ours.” 44
Confident the differences in figures could be bridged, Jefferson
scheduled a special message to Congress. Again he had a Spanish
policy.
In acting so boldly Jefferson betrayed an uncharacteristic
hastiness indicating he did not thoroughly comprehend the multifaceted aspects of the problem. Indubitably the President could
not have foreseen that John Randolph would use the occasion to
stage a dramatic break with his administration. He should have
realized, however, that using the French as intermediaries would
place Bowdoin in an awkward position. In effect, with Erving
performing satisfactorily in Madrid and Armstrong capable of
bargaining by himself, Bowdoin was not likely to fulfill a useful
task. In short, he should have been recalled. Jefferson’s decision
also opened the Republicans to charges of corruption from
Federalist ranks. The President could not help but be aware that
when the secret details leaked to the public, the Federalists would
again trumpet quasi-credible stories of “French influence.”
Lastly, adoption of such a proposal placed Jefferson on the same
plane as the crafty Talleyrand.
There were several alternative courses open to Jefferson. He
might have laid the facts before the American people and let
them guide his hand, as Henry Adams has suggested. He could
have continued with the status quo, allowing Erving and Bowdoin, whom he could have ordered to Madrid, to persist in the
wearisome task of negotiating, in the hope they could wear the
procrastinating Spaniards down. Another alternative would have
43. Entry o f November 12, 1805, in Sawvel, Anas of Jefferson, 232-33.
44. Entry o f November 19, 1805, ibid., 233-34.
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been to halt efforts, trusting to the future to let the Florida fruit
ripen and fall into the hands of a stronger America. Whether the
President and his associates weighed these possibilities is uncertain. In view of the fate of Jefferson’s proposal, any of these
alternatives would have been preferable.
On December 6, the President conveyed a special message to
Congress which was meeting in closed session. In the message he
listed many of the same points previously used with his cabinet.
With Europe aflame the moment seemed ripe to settle with
Spain. Moreover, Napoleon seemed predisposed to favor an
amicable accord. Left unsaid was any hint of the unnamed
agent’s visit to Armstrong or the decision to channel money to
Spain while the French stood by in a mediator’s role. Only in
attached papers was the latter disclosed, and then in veiled language. 46 Clearly Jefferson was seeking to develop congressional
support for his policy even though it was not delineated.
Instead of rallying support to his standard, the President
unleashed a Pandora’s box of debate that lasted over a period of
four months. The first phase of action ended on February 6, 1806,
when the house voted the necessary funds to soothe Spain. 46
Needless to say, Federalists recognized France as the culprit
which stood to benefit from any appropriation. Yet they were
strangely quiet in comparison to their usual verbal vendettas. The
reason was that Randolph had turned his withering sarcasm from
the Federalists to the President and his Florida scheme.
Despite Randolph’s antics the President elected to plunge
ahead. To speed negotiations for the Floridas he nominated
Armstrong to join Bowdoin as a special emissary accredited to
Spain. Although in later years he said he “yielded (with a reluctance well remembered by all),” coming on the heels of Ran45. “Confidential Message on Spain,” December 6, 1805, in Paul L.
Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson, 12 vols. (New York and
London, 1904-1905), X, 203-05. See also the exchange of letters between Jefferson and Gallatin dated December 3, 4, 1805, in Adams,
Writings of Albert Gallatin, I, 275-82.
46. Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 1st Sess. Supplementary Journal,
1137-38. Shortly afterwards Turreau reported that congressmen
looked on the Floridas as complimentary to the Louisiana territory.
Consequently they would be willing to “pay dear” to obtain them.
Turreau to Talleyrand, February 12, 1806, Archives du Ministere
des Affaires Etrangeres, LIX.
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dolph’s disaffection and coupled with knowledge that the two
Americans were distrustful of each other, Jefferson merely complicated an already confused picture. 47 One Federalist saw Jefferson proceeding “pale and trembling in his capital, filled with
anxiety and looking to Europe for events to justify his policy and
extricate him from his difficulties.” 48 As oversimplified and sarcastic as this opinion was, there was an element of truth in it.
Once embarked on the program, Jefferson could not accept
failure, and the further he walked into the thicket, the more
enmeshed he became.
After a close vote confirmed Armstrong, Jefferson sought to
soothe congressional sensibilities by enticing Wilson Cary Nicholas, a prominent Virginia Republican, to join the negotiating
team. The addition of a Southerner, he reasoned, was one way he
might “gain the confidence of the whole senate.” 49 Whether
Nicholas’ acceptance would have achieved his aim, the President
did not discover because Nicholas, begging the responsibilities of
a large family, declined. 50 In retrospect Republicans might have
been calmed with Nicholas in Paris. Whether Federalists, rigid
as they were, would have changed their sentiments is problematical. More than likely they would have adhered, as one-time
Representative Timothy Pitkin did, to a doctrinaire belief that
the money for Spain had been shipped to France to go “into the
pockets of Bonaparte and Talleyrand.” 51
47. Jefferson to Monroe, April 11, 1808, Monroe Papers, Library of
Congress. Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1800-1809, 360,
ascribes the linking of Armstrong and Bowdoin to Jefferson’s eagerness for the Floridas.
48. James McHenry to Pickering, February 19, 1806, in Bernard C.
Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry (Cleveland, 1907), 533.
49. Jefferson to Wilson Nicholas, March 24, April 13, 1806, Jefferson
Papers, Library of Congress.
50. Nicholas to Jefferson, April 2, 1806, ibid.
51. Timothy Pitkin to Simeon Baldwin, April 1, 1806, in Simeon E.
Baldwin, Life and Letters of Simeon Baldwin (New Haven, n.d.),
4 5 1 - 5 2 . M o r e t h a n s e v e n y e a r s a f t e r J e f f e r s o n ’s d e a t h a d i e h a r d
Federalist still clung to the idea that $2,000,000 was sent to France
“for no other reason than that France wanted money and must
have it.” William Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public Characters,
and Public Events; From the Peace of 1783 to the Peace of 1815
(Boston, 1834), 249.
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Undaunted by the various blocks thrown up, Jefferson persisted in his belief that West Florida could be won. Doubtless he
knew that his and his party’s stature would be enhanced by such
an acquisition. Working toward this goal, he trusted that the
French would overlook Randolph’s shafts while Napoleon coaxed
the Spaniards into at least ceding West Florida. Respecting the
ethics of working through France, the President certainly would
have agreed with the views of a scribe calling himself “Timoleon,”
who wrote in the semi-official National Intelligencer. Ridiculing
the Federalist recitations of “Millions for defense and not a cent
for tribute,” Timoleon queried his readers if it was not a fact that
the Floridas were not of strategic importance. Did Spain not
own them? Was it not true that French influence was dominant
in Madrid? Alluding to the subsidy paid to France, he asserted
that the Spaniards “dare not disobey the mandates of France.”
As Spain was in arrears on payments, suppose the former sold
land to America to pay France? Stating that America was aware
of this, he concluded his exposition by asking if it was “any reflection on his [Jefferson’s] honesty under such circumstances to
make the purchase ?” 52 Appearing as they did in a newspaper
closely linked to the administration, Timoleon’s sentiments
merited close scrutiny because they indicated the bent of highlevel thinking.
While Jefferson and his colleagues were resisting Randolph’s
siege during the winter of 1805-1806, negotiations in Paris and
Madrid remained at a standstill. Bowdoin had scarcely arrived in
Paris when he lamented that “Things . . . don’t look so prosperous here as I expected.” 53 Echoing Bowdoin from Madrid,
Erving stated categorically that no accord could be reached. It
simply was impossible to communicate with “baseness and apathy
on one side & the most barefaced corruption on both.” Only a
solid, swift blow, in Erving’s opinion, would arouse the Spaniards
from their torpor and “convince France that we are no longer to
be trifled with.” Despondently he heaped scorn on the “ignorant
and preposterous pride which still hangs about” Spain’s “tattered
grandeur. ” “They have no statesmen, no force, and no money,”
52. Washington National Intelligencer, November 5, 1806.
53. Bowdoin to Erving, November 3, 1805, in Bowdoin and Temple
Papers, 255-56; Bowdoin to Monroe, January 20, 1806, Monroe
Papers, Library of Congress.
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he added. 54 Together these letters convey the gist of numerous
dispatches and private communications sent following Bowdoin’s
arrival on the Continent and reflect the hopelessness of any
change in the status quo, the prime reason for Bowdoin’s nomination.
Clouding his mission, in addition to Spanish intransigence
and French procrastination, Bowdoin became involved in a bitter
feud with Armstrong. Not recognizing that he would be remaining in Paris the many months he did, Bowdoin could not comprehend why Armstrong acted so jealously toward him. Admitting
he was not accredited to the Empire, Bowdoin believed he and
Armstrong should work as a team toward a common national
goal. Senate approval of a Bowdoin-Armstrong joint commission
naturally strengthened this sentiment. Yet Armstrong refused officially to introduce him to Talleyrand. Bowdoin was further
rankled when Armstrong communicated what Bowdoin deemed
to be vital information to the French foreign minister.
Armstrong’s version presented a different picture. Bowdoin,
he asserted, had arrived from Britain “red-hot” over British
insults to America’s neutral rights. He implored Armstrong to
inform the French that if “we could be disembarressed [sic]
of our controversey [sic] with Spain upon reasonable terms we
should be in condition & sentiment to resist G. B. by force.” Attempting to dissuade Bowdoin from doing anything rash, Armstrong pointed out that such a proposal was beyond his powers
and that France “would expect a more solemn act, as a preliminary to the discharge of her part of the bargain.” Dismissing
Armstrong’s reasoning, Bowdoin announced that he would make
his proposal in person to Napoleon who was then in Germany.
Only Daniel Parker, a fellow American from Massachusetts, was
able to bring Bowdoin to his senses by telling him he would never
get a chance to be near the Emperor, much less see him personally. Armstrong nevertheless claimed he and Bowdoin were “on the
most friendly terms.” 55 Armstrong made no claims for mutual
friendship a few months later when he reported to Madison that
Bowdoin had divulged confidential information entrusted to him
54. Erving to Bowdoin, November 19, 1805, Bowdoin and Temple
Papers, 259.
55. Armstrong to Jefferson, February 17, 1806, Jefferson Papers, Library
of Congress.
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directly to Talleyrand. By then hopelessly at odds, Armstrong
assured Bowdoin that as long as he shared the commission as
minister to Spain he felt justified in conferring “exclusively” with
Talleyrand. 56
Stymied everywhere, Bowdoin reflected on the course of
events. He blamed his and Monroe’s failure on “stockjobbers”
who exercised undue influence on the unsuspecting Emperor. 57
In May 1806, he wrote Jefferson that the money appropriated by
Congress was whetting “the avarice & increases the thirst for obtaining money” among the financial interests in Britain, France,
and Holland. Moreover, it was these individuals who were blocking arrangements with Spain. He then related how Henry Labouchere, Sir Francis Baring’s son-in-law and agent of the House
of Hope in Amsterdam, had visited him and intimated “that I
might give credence to his substitute, Mr. Daniel Parker.” Labouchere claimed that he and his associates “hold the powers of
the prince of peace [Manuel Godoy], to convey to the U. S. the
two Floridas, upon the condition of the payment of a stipulated
sum: that if we could agree upon that sum, the other parts of the
treaty could be made easy, & that I would proceed to Madrid &
execute it.” Hiding his astonishment, Bowdoin failed to reach
agreement with Labouchere upon a “stipulated sum,” and the
Frenchman departed.
Deliberating on Labouchere’s visit, Bowdoin detected a web
of conspiracy centering around Daniel Parker. It was from Parker that Bowdoin received intelligence of “Mr. Tallerand’s [sic]
office & thro him, [that] I obtained the information w ch I had
upon the subject of the propositions w ch had been transmitted to
the U. S. by Gen. Armstrong. . . . [Armstrong’s dispatch of
September 14, 1805?]” 58 Parker, he observed, was “daily
closeted” with Armstrong. 59 So influential was Parker that Bowdoin charged he had “by means of intrigue . . . converted himself
into a kind of minister of the U. S. !” 60 Similarly, years later,
56. Armstrong to Bowdoin, May 4, 1806, Bowdoin-Temple Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
57. Bowdoin to Monroe, February 24, 1806, Jefferson Papers, Library of
Congress.
58. Bowdoin to Jefferson, May 20, 1806, ibid.
59. Bowdoin to Erving, September 9, 1806, Bowdoin and Temple Papers,
326. Also Bowdoin to Erving, October 11, 1807, ibid., 434.
60. Bowdoin to Erving, September 9, 1806, ibid., 326.
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Minister William H. Crawford noted that many said Parker was
“in fact the minister for the last ten years.” 61 Parker had been a
partner in a New York shipping firm and a large supply contractor to the Continental Army. Deeply in debt in the mid1780s, he had fled to Paris in 1787, where he immediately began
speculating in American bills. Jefferson, then American minister
to France, knew him slightly and was amazed at the funds he had
at his disposal. 62 Baffled by Parker’s manipulations, John Adams,
American minister in London, admitted that “though I love him
very well [he] is too ingenious for me.” 63 Details of Parker’s
activities during the French Revolution are sparse, but he apparently made large sums of money judging by the lavish hospitality he provided guests at his 1,200 acre estate near Paris. The
shadowy nature of Parker’s activities only increased Bowdoin’s
suspicions.
Other acquaintances joined Bowdoin in informing Jefferson
about Armstrong and Parker. George Sullivan, son of Massachusetts Governor James Sullivan and a frequent traveler between
Paris and Madrid, said Armstrong’s contemptuous attitude
toward Bowdoin “disgraces our Govt.” Worse, his “collusion
with Speculators, whose avowed object is to swindle the money
from the treasury . . . blasts all the blooming honors of Mr. Jefferson’s administration.” 64 To Monroe Sullivan reported that
“P-----” [Louis-Andre Pichon?], a former French diplomat in
America, advised him that his “gov t have become insatiably
avaricious, and will never cease their contrivances to draw money
from our nation.” 65 Sullivan neglected to expose Armstrong’s
role to Monroe, but the latter was aware of it from Consul Fulwar Skipwith’s letters. 66 Even as Monroe and Armstrong recom6 1 . E n t r i e s o f J u l y 2 8 , 3 0 , 1 8 1 3 , i n D a n i e l C . K n o w l t o n , e d . , The
Journal of William H. Crawford, Smith College Studies in History
(October 1925), XI, 30-31.
62. Jefferson to Nicholas & Jacob van Staphorst, July 30, 1785, in Julian
P. Boyd, et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 17 vols. to date
(Princeton, 1950---), VIII, 331-32.
63. John Adams to Jefferson, February 12, 1788, ibid., XII, 581.
64. George Sullivan to Erving, May 5, 1806, Monroe Papers, New York
Public Library.
65. Sullivan to Monroe, May 5, 1806, ibid.
66. Fulwar Skipwith (1765-1834), a Virginian and an acquaintance of
Jefferson, served in France as a commercial agent and consul
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mended “certain energetic measures with regard to Spain,” Armstrong, Skipwith said, “was laying a project . . . of seducing our
Government.” Ultimately, he continued, Armstrong expected to
finish with the “cash trunk” in his possession. 67 Though these
writers all criticized Armstrong, it must be borne in mind that
Armstrong, just as Livingston, occupied a controversial post
where he was subject to abuse regardless of what he did. And
those who accused him of corruption were drawn from a limited
circle and were well acquainted with one another. At least one
writer traces the Armstrong-Bowdoin feud to a MassachusettsVirginia connection represented by Skipwith, Erving, Bowdoin,
and Monroe, and its attempts to outflank the “Empire State
group” that Armstrong and his predecessor sprang from. 68 Hence
general. Returning to America in 1808, Skipwith journeyed to West
Florida in 1809 and was a leader of the West Florida Revolution
of 1810. For a more detailed account see Henry Bartholomew Cox’s
published Master of Arts thesis, The Partisan American: Fulwar
Skipwith of Virginia (Washington, 1964).
67. Skipwith to Monroe, May 31, 1806, Monroe Papers, New York
Public Library; see also Skipwith to Randolph, September 24, 1808,
ibid. Back in the United States nearly five years afterward, Armstrong forwarded Madison a letter and deposition signed by Ch[arles]
M. Somers, an Irish-born speculator residing in Paris and a personal
letter from Parker. Somers stated that “being much q u e s t i o n e d ” by
Bowdoin about Armstrong’s knowledge of speculative activities, “I did
add a Post Script in which I mentioned your name,” but only
sketching Armstrong’s acquaintance with Parker and other speculators.
In his deposition Somers maintained these individuals had sought
3,000,000 acres of West Florida land. To speed this acquisition a
sweetener of 3,000,000 francs was available for key figures as soon
as the territory was in American hands. Paradoxically in forwarding
these accounts to Madison, Armstrong declared that “Mr. Bowdoin
should have had any confidence in the declarations of a man [Somers]
so entirely destitute of principle & character” was surprising. See
Somers to Armstrong, May 20, 1810, including a “Copie d’une declaration remis par Mr Somers a Mr Bowdoin, February 5, 1807,”
enclosed in Armstrong to Madison, January 23, 1811, Despatches
from France. Upon seeing Somers’ deposition on May 24, 1810,
Parker wrote Armstrong that “nothing forbade me from buying from
the King of Spain what certain[ly] belonged to him & what of course
he had a right to sell. . . .” In any event Parker vowed Somers’
declaration was “entirely false.” Parker to Armstrong, May 25, 1810,
in Armstrong to Madison, January 23, 1811, Monroe Papers, New
York Public Library,
68. Cox, West Florida Controversy, 237.
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it is not possible to indict Armstrong without more impartial
evidence.
Shortly after Labouchere’s visit to Bowdoin, Skipwith had a
similar experience when a Frenchman identified only as Dautremont suggested two possible routes to reach arrangements with
Spain. Through an aide of Talleyrand, Ernest Roux, “I might
immediately open . . . a private, safe & direct communication”
with an important Spaniard. The alternative was to meet the
Spaniard, then referred to as “Mr. Es.” [Don Eugenio Izquierdo
de Ribera y Lezaun] through Dautremont’s father-in-law, Doyen.
However, this intervention failed too because Skipwith insisted
that “Mr. Es.” contact him first rather than Skipwith’s taking the
initiative. 69 The mutual antipathy Bowdoin and Armstrong
shared for each other, the suspicions aroused by Randolph, and
especially Bowdoin’s rejection of overtures suggesting corruption
again left the administration without a Florida policy.
Although these unofficial probes indicated France would see
Spain part with the Floridas only for a price, official French
records demonstrated otherwise. Talleyrand, for instance, had
warmed to the point where he saw definite advantages in America’s possession of West Florida. Would it not, he asked the Emperor, benefit France by promoting commercial rivalry and political disharmony among the states? 70 To the French charge in
Madrid, Talleyrand declared it behooved the Spaniards to be
realistic: West Florida straddled several rivers flowing into the
Gulf of Mexico, thus blocking American commerce. The Americans doubtlessly would be ready to use the first pretext to seize
the area. Would Godoy not be wise to heed American proposals?
Acting on Talleyrand’s reasoning, the charge won the unenthusiastic Prince of the Peace to Talleyrand’s view. Exclusive of events
taking place in Paris, Spanish-American difficulties could have
been settled promptly if French pressure on the Spanish had remained constant.
Sadly though, the exigencies of the European power struggle
dictated otherwise. Seeking a new kingdom for the Bourbons deposed from Naples, Napoleon settled on the Balearic Islands as an
69.

Skipwith to Bowdoin, June 12, 1806, in Bowdoin and Temple
Papers, 309-11.
70. Talleyrand to Napoleon, May 6, 1806, Archives du Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres, LIX.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol47/iss3/3

22

Egan: United States, France, and West Florida, 1803-1807
U NITED S TATES , F RANCE ,

AND

W EST F LORIDA

249

ideal realm. Informed of this, the Spanish reacted so violently
that the Emperor dropped his project. In an attempt to placate
the testy Spaniards, Napoleon affirmed that West Florida was
Spanish, because the Louisiana territory extended only to the
Iberville River, not the Perdido. Furthermore, should the United
States molest Spain’s colonies, she would face joint European resistance. 71 Meanwhile, he urged the Spaniards to reinforce their
troop strength “for encouraging a good and vigorous defense”
where the Americans threatened. 72
For all practical purposes American attempts to gain West
Florida while Jefferson was in office ended. Disgusted with the
course of events, Bowdoin cried that “being a minister is neither
a source of pleasure or profit, it will not afford the first because
deception and deceit characterize those with whom you must
associate”; profit was impossible because a minister’s salary
covered no more than half one’s expenses. For two years, Bowdoin complained, he had to contend with successive indignities
only to observe the situation was no more promising than when
he arrived. Inquiring to Armstrong about the prospects for a
joint settlement, Bowdoin was assured that none appeared in the
offing. Feeling his services no longer were needed, Bowdoin left
for home.
Despite the bad news filtering across the Atlantic, administration leaders and other Americans saw no reason for altering ambitions. In May 1807, Madison warned that Spanish delaying
tactics could not be tolerated indefinitely. From Madrid Erving,
worried about the personal consequences of failure, renewed
earlier calls for vigorous action: “An ultimate & decided course
must be worked out which must be Executed by honest zeal &
determined vigor. . . .” 73 Similarly Jefferson favored the utmost
effort to arrive at an agreement, even under French auspices.
Averring that Spain acted with “perfidy and injustice,” the Pres71. Talleyrand to Turreau, July 31, 1806, ibid.; also Champagny to
Eugene de Beauharnais, August 31, 1807, in Robertson, Louisiana
Under Spain, France, and the United States, 1785-1807, II, 211.
72. Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 23, 1806, Correspondance de Napoleon
I er publiee par ordre de l'empereur Napoleon III, 32 vols. (Paris,
1858-1870), XII, 484-85.
73. Ewing to Monroe, January 24, 1807, Monroe Papers, Library of
Congress.
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ident declared that “we have kept our hands off of her till now
. . . purely out of respect to France & from the value we set” on
her “friendship.” As a consequence of this amicability, “we expect . . . from the . . . emperor that he will either compel Spain
to do us justice, or abandon her to us.” 74 Aware of the bitterness
existing between Bowdoin and Armstrong, Jefferson still refused
to follow the suggestion of a friend that a mediator work to
smooth tempers. In conjunction with his cabinet he said it was
thought not “advisable” under existing circumstances. 75 Clearly
Jefferson and his allies had not grasped the idea that much had
changed from the previous year.
On June 22, 1807, H.M.S. Leopard attacked the American
vessel Chesapeake off the Atlantic coast. This outrage not only
aroused Americans to fever pitch, but also allowed the administration to break off the protracted Paris negotiations without
losing face. Realizing this, Madison issued instructions accordingly. 76 Thereafter, little was said politically of this once explosive issue until 1810 when a “revolt” delivered part of West
Florida to the American fold.
Nevertheless, Jefferson and his successor were vitally interested in the fate of the area. Aware of their concern and interested in dragging the United States into the war against Britain,
Napoleon cleverly suggested a joint Spanish-American defense of
the Floridas should America and Britain fight. As a further enticement, Napoleon hinted that a Franco-American alliance
would stimulate him to pressure the Spaniards to cede the
Floridas. 77 Perfectly aware of Napoleon’s intent, Madison, speaking on his superior’s behalf, vetoed any idea of joining France
even for such a cherished objective as the Floridas. The United
74. Jefferson to Bowdoin, April 2, 1807, Jefferson Papers, Library of
Congress.
75. Jefferson to Short, June 12, 1807, ibid. In the same letter Jefferson
c o n t r a s t e d h i s r e g a r d f o r h i s c a b i n e t ’s v i e w t o A d a m s : “ I h a v e
heard indeed that my predecessor sometimes decided things against
his council by dashing & trampling his wig on the floor. This only
proves what you & I know, that he had a better heart than head.”
76. Madison to Armstrong and Bowdoin, July 15, 1807, in Bowdoin
and Temple Papers, 399.
77. Napoleon to Champagny, February 2, 1808, in Correspondance de
Napoleon, XVI, 301; and Armstrong to Madison, February 15, 1808,
Despatches from France.
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States, he emphasized, would adhere to a fair and strict
neutrality. 78
Leaving office in March 1809, Jefferson looked back on eight
momentous years at the nation’s helm. Among his major accomplishments were the bridging of the transition from Federalist to
Republican control, the Louisiana Treaty, debt reduction, and
establishing his party as the predominant force in American politics. Conversely the major setback he had suffered, excluding
repeal of the embargo in his last days in office, was in his drive
for the Floridas. It is instructive to contrast his successes with
this failure. Always with the former he refused to take rash
actions, preferring to weigh the available pros and cons. Similarly
he solicited his cabinet’s advice and was not adverse to listening
to and implementing the opinions of others. Moreover, he sought
to act within the confines of Republican ideology. With the Floridas one notes a lapse in his usual caution. Certainly he acted
rashly in seeking to use money to achieve his ends, aware as he
was of previous incidences of corruption. Equally, his claim to
the contrary, his nomination of Armstrong and Bowdoin reflected on his usual good judgment. His refusal to recall one or
the other after he recognized the two ministers’ mutual antipathy
was inexplicable, even allowing for his gentleness in handling
people. In sum, his Florida policy does him little credit. The
United States eventually acquired what he desired in spite of his
policy. The European war and geographic reality fortunately
presented unmatched opportunities.
If Jefferson bungled his Florida policy, Napoleon did the
same. Again, it was against the background of the European war
that he did so. Needing money, the Spanish subsidy was more appealing than intangible American good will. Thus he turned a
cold shoulder to the idea of aiding Pinckney in Madrid. Expediency triumphed again when the Emperor warmed to the proposal
broached by Marbois to Armstrong to sell the Floridas for 60,000,000 francs. Why? Because Spain, as Marbois readily confided, was unable to meet her 6,000,000 francs per month commitment. These blunders, important as they were, portended even
greater errors in the post-1807 period. Whereas a Florida policy
78. Madison to Armstrong, May 2, 1808, Instructions of the Department
of State.
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favorable to the United States might have lost some of its sheen
as the war intensified after 1807, it cannot be doubted that a
commercial policy after that year, even half-way considerate of
American rights, would have reaped large dividends. But as his
shiftiness with regard to the Floridas indicated, Napoleon, ever
a prisoner of expediency, did not possess vision.
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